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REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants have failed to specifically controvert any of Plaintiff s statement 
of material facts. Instead, Defendants have set forth their own "facts" which, unfortunately, 
do not provide specific page and line citations to the record, from which the court and 
counsel may readily ascertain the accuracy of the factual assertions. At times, Defendants 
do not even generally cite the record to support their factual assertions. Also, the citations 
Defendants do provide often do not support the allegations which Defendants make 





SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS IMPROPER BECAUSE A 
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AS TO 
WHETHER DEFENDANTS USED DEREK NGUYEN TO TEST 
THE SALES-MODEL VENTILATOR, OR, AS DEFENDANTS 
ASSERT, USED THE SALES MODEL SOLELY AS AN 
EMERGENCY TREATMENT MEASURE TO SAVE DEREK'S 
LIFE. 
Defendants' arguments, like the trial court's entry of summary judgment in the 
case, skip over a genuine issue of material fact which bars summary judgment. Defendants 
and the trial court improperly assume that Defendants' agents used the sales-model ventilator 
for emergency treatment only, and not in any way as part of the testing and evaluation 
process (a.k.a. the CTM assessment process) for the sales model. For example, Defendant 
PCMC begins its argument, "The undisputed testimony establishes that the (sic) Dr. Witte 
ordered the use of the Pulmonetic ventilator outside of the CTM process and based on 
Derek's acute medical needs." PCMC brief, p. 14. Defendant University's "Summary of 
Argument" begins, "This case arises from medical treatment decisions made by Dr. Witte. 
Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to criticize those decisions " Defendant U of U's brief, 
p. 21. Likewise, the trial court's ruling which excluded Dr. Goldenring not only assumes 
use of the sales model for treatment only, but explicitly states as a basis for its ruling, "Dr. 
Witte testified that her decision and ability to use the FDA approved Pulmonetic ventilator 
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was based solely upon Derek's needs and was not dependent on Primary Children Medical 
Center's administrative review process." Addendum 5, R. 2594. 
In the context of a summary judgment motion, a trial court cannot simply 
resolve a material factual issue on its own, accepting the assertions of the moving party and 
summarily rejecting the evidence of the non-moving party. To the contrary, both the trial 
court and the appellate court are obligated to view the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and determine whether 
a genuine issue of material fact exists, barring summary judgment. Asael Farr & Sons Co. 
v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 2008 UT App 315, f 11. The trial court failed in this 
obligation. 
Contrary to the trial court's and Defendants' assumption, the evidence shows 
that the case arises from a decision by Madoline Witte, M.D., and Tammy Bleak, to use 
Derek Nguyen as a test subject for evaluation of the sales-model ventilator. In his principal 
brief, Plaintiff presented the following evidence, showing that Defendants' agents used 
Derek Nguyen to test and evaluate the sales-model ventilator, rather than use the sales-model 
as an emergency treatment measure: 
Dr. Witte, as Medical Director of Pediatric Life-Flight Services at 
PCMC, initiated, with her life-flight team, a search to purchase a new 
pediatric ventilator for PCMC's life-flight team. 
No life-flight ventilator had ever been used for hospital patient care, 
and the new life-flight ventilator, once purchased, would not be used 
for hospital patient care. 
-3-
The sales-model life-flight ventilator was only in the hospital to be 
tested and evaluated, not for patient care. 
A clinical trial of the sales model was scheduled to start November 26, 
2001 in the pediatric intensive care unit ("PICU") at PCMC. 
On November 26, 2001, the clinical trial was on the verge of being 
postponed, apparently because there were no moderately-ill, stable 
children in the PICU available to test the sales model. 
Dr. Witte, an active member of the CTM assessment committee 
charged with testing and evaluating the sales model, then called Tammy 
Bleak, chairperson of the CTM committee and PCMC's equipment 
specialist, and informed her, "[W]e have a patient we could use this 
on. 
Following a training session for CTM committee members, the sales 
model was taken to the PICU and placed on Derek Nguyen, so that 
committee members could observe it in action. 
The CTM committee members observing use of the sales model on 
Derek were not his heathcare providers and had nothing to do with his 
care, but had everything to do with evaluation of the sales model. 
The vendor was also invited to attend the use of the sales model on 
Derek, to answer questions of the CTM committee members who were 
observing. 
Defendants' CTM committee reports reflect that the sales model was 
used on Derek for testing and evaluation, as part of the CTM 
assessment process: 
October 30, 2001 - - The team met today to 
discuss how best to do the clinical trials. It was 
agreed that if the vendors can accommodate, then 
the trials will take place the week after 
Thanksgiving, November 26 through 30, 2001. 
• • • 
November 30,2001 - - There has been an 
unfortunate incident with one of the vents. 
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Following a training session the vent was taken 
to the PICU and placed on a patient that was 
being transported for tests. On the way back to 
the PICU the vent failed. The patient did not 
survive. An investigation is underway and the 
assessment has been put on hold pending the 
outcome of the investigation. 
January 31, 2002 - - The investigation has been 
completed. . . . The vendor has taken steps to 
recall and/or change out the screw(s) in the entire 
line of ventilators. This does not bury the fact 
that a huge lesson was learned in connection 
with the clinical trial portion of the assessment 
process. Tammy Bleak, the team leader has had 
lengthy discussions with risk management, 
administration, clinical engineering, the vendor 
and others as appropriate regarding the 
continuation of the assessment. 
R. 3249. 
Contrary to Defendants' unsupported characterizations, there was no 
emergency that required use of the sales model for patient care. Dr. 
Witte admitted, that if the sales model were not in the hospital, she 
would have waited before deciding whether to transport Derek for a CT 
scan: "I think it was possible that had he continued to worsen our hand 
might have been forced and we would have tried to do that anyway. I 
think at that particular moment in time had that ventilator not been 
available I would not have taken him for a CT scan." R. 1255,43:17-
22. 
As set forth above, Defendants' self-serving assertions that use of the sales-
model on Derek was "outside the CTM process", is belied by the conduct and statements of 
Defendants' agents around and at the time of the incident. The fact that Dr. Witte says that 
use of the sales model was not part of the assessment process, does not make it so. A jury 
must determine if Defendants' story is to be believed, or, as the evidence very strongly 
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shows, the story is a pretext to cover the fact that Defendants' agents, through their improper 
use of the sales model on Derek, were responsible for his death. 
Furthermore, while it's easy to say that the sales model was being used "outside 
the CTM process", according to hospital rules, there could be no use of the sales model 
outside the CTM process. Tammy Bleak testified that, as Children's Services Equipment 
Specialist, she had the duty to ensure reliability of the sales-model ventilator through 
completion of the CTM testing and evaluation process, before allowing its use on a patient 
outside the testing and evaluation parameters. R. 1241-42,72:10-73:18. See also, R. 1230-
32, 24:24-31:21; R. 1233, 33:13-15; R. 3249. 
Arguing for rejection of Dr. Goldenring's opinions, Defendant PCMC 
unwittingly acknowledges the unresolved material factual issue, but incorrectly assumes the 
appellate court will just resolve it, as the trial court did before: 
If this Court determines that Dr. Witte's decision to use the Pulmonetic 
ventilator was outside of the CTM process, Dr. Goldenring's opinions 
fail, as they are tied to his belief that Dr. Witte and PCMC breached the 
standard of care because they did not follow the CTM process and its 
guidelines. 
PCMC's brief, p. 18. Of course, it is not for this Court, just as it was not for the trial court 
to determine if the decision of Defendants' agents to use the sales model was outside of the 
CTM process. This is a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to determine. Therefore, 
the court should reverse the trial court's summary judgment and remand the case for trial. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
Defendants fail to distinguish and, in fact, do not even address the Gulbraa 
and Sorensen cases cited and discussed in Plaintiffs principal brief. See Plaintiffs 
Principal Brief, pp. 35-36, Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT App 126, Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2006 UT App 340, 
143 P.3d 295. These cases reversed the trial courts' dismissals of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress ("IIED") claims, holding that the conduct in question met the threshold 
necessary to maintain IIED actions, and that it was for the fact-finder to determine 
whether the conduct was outrageous and intolerable, and whether plaintiffs distress was 
severe. Gulbraa, at f 23, Sorensen at fflj 24, 25. 
As noted above, Defendants want the court to ignore all the evidence 
presented by Plaintiff and just assume that their agents were using the sales model to save 
Derek's life, rather than using Derek as a test subject for the sales model. As set forth 
above, that does not comply with the summary judgment standard. That standard requires 
the court to consider the non-moving party's evidence and, not only consider it, but view 
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Asael Farr & Sons Co., at | 1 1 . 
Applying the summary judgment standard of review, the facts do satisfy the 
threshold for maintaining an IIED claim for jury consideration. The facts and all 
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reasonable inferences viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs case, shows that in 
violation of the hospital rules, defendants' agents used plaintiffs critically-ill, medically-
unstable son, without plaintiffs permission, to test a sales-model ventilator that they were 
considering for purchase. The sales model had never previously been used on any patient, 
much less a critically-ill, unstable patient, and Defendants' agents did not even take it on 
a trial run to see if it would function properly in transport before using it on Derek. 
Defendants' agent, Tammy Bleak, knew that she had not assessed the 
reliability of the sales model for patient use through completion of the CTM assessment 
process, as required by the hospital's testing and evaluation requirements. Defendants' 
agents also knew that Derek was ventilator-dependent and would likely not be able to 
tolerate even a brief interruption in his ventilation. Defendants' agents used Derek and 
put his life at enormous risk, all without even informing his father or getting permission. 
As a result, Derek suffocated and died. A reasonable jury could certainly conclude that 
the conduct was "of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that 
[it] offend[s] against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality." 
Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 
UTApp 126,121 
A reasonable jury could likewise conclude that Derek's father suffered 
severe emotional distress, and that any reasonable person would have known that severe 
emotional distress would result from failure of the untested sales model. Plaintiff was 
-8-
devastated by the death of his only child, made all the more excruciating by the tragic, 
recent loss of his wife. 
Plaintiff notes that the trial court also erred by ruling that IIED must be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence. Addendum 3, p. 2, R. 3388. There is no such 
requirement in the law. Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT App 126, \ 21, citing Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 
358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961). (emphasis added). 
In sum, Plaintiff has made a threshold showing for IIED and the court 
should reverse the trial court's summary judgment and remand the claim for jury 
determination. 
POINT III 
THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AGAINST DEFENDANT PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL 
CENTER. 
Under Utah Law, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages against a defendant 
for "conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of 
the rights of others." Utah Code §70-18-l(l)(a). From the facts and conduct of defendants' 
agents set forth above in POINT II, which must be considered and viewed in a light most 
favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that the conduct of defendant 
PCMC's agents in using Plaintiffs crictically-ill, medically unstable son as a test subject for 
a sales model ventilator, without Plaintiffs permission, manifests a knowing and reckless 
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disregard for the safety of Derek Nguyen and the rights of his father, the plaintiff. Therefore, 
the court should reverse the summary judgment of the trial court and remand the claim for 
trial. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS ARE SUBJECT TO LIABILITY FOR FAILING 
TO OBTAIN INFORMED CONSENT. 
Defendants argue that they should have no duty to disclose to a parent, their 
intention to use his critically-ill, unstable child to test a sales-model ventilator, nor to inform 
him of the risks associated with that. They also argue that they should have no duty to obtain 
parental permission. 
Defendant University basis its argument on case law that has no relevance and 
does not excuse the University's duty, case law which addresses whether the FDA status of 
a medical device need be disclosed. Defendant University also basis its argument on the 
assumption that "Dr. Witte's use of the ventilator was outside the scope of the CTM 
process." Defendant University's brief, p. 46. That, however, is an issue for jury resolution. 
PCMC argues that hospitals generally do not owe a duty of informed consent 
and that the duty of informed consent is upon "those physicians who have actively managed 
the patient's care." Here, however, PCMC's agent, Dr. Madolin Witte was one of the 
physicians actively managing Derek's care and the physician who, along with PCMC's 
employee Tammy Bleak, decided to use Derek Nguyen to test the sales-model ventilator. As 
an active member of PCMC's CTM committee which established the rules for testing, 
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evaluating, and assessing the reliability of the sales model ventilator, as a paid Medical 
Director of Pediatric Life Flights Services for PCMC, and as a clinician practicing 
exclusively at PCMC, Dr. Witte was the employee, agent, and/or apparent agent of PCMC. 
R. 2372-74,25:6-11,21:18-22:6,23:7-12,23:21-24:9,24:10-22,24:23-25:5,25:12-18, and 
26:20-27:3. Dr. Witte's conduct is legally the conduct of PCMC. PCMC, like Defendant 
University, is thus vicariously liable for Dr. Witte's failure to obtain informed consent. 
PCMC incorrectly asserts that the "vast majority of courts refuse to impose a 
duty to obtain informed consent upon a hospital." See PCMC's brief p. 29. The cases cited 
by Defendant involve facts where an independent physician has alone ordered or provided 
the treatment that gives rise to the cause of action for failure to obtain informed consent. 
Utah statutory law, like the law of all jurisdictions, holds hospitals subject to liability for 
failure to obtain informed consent for their own treatment decisions. See, Utah Code §78B-
3-406. The Utah Code recognizes that any "health care provider" owes a legal duty to obtain 
informed consent. Id. 
PCMC, like Defendant University, was a "health care provider" that made 
health care decisions for one-year-old Derek Nguyen, both through its own employees and 
through its agent or employee, Madeline Witte, M.D. It thus owed a duty of informed 
consent to Derek's father, the plaintiff. In the matter at bar, Defendants PCMC and 
University actually recognized their duty to obtain informed consent from the parents of 
potential test-subject children, to whom it wanted to attach the sales-model ventilator. 
-11-
Defendants PCMC and University assigned their employee or agent, Dr. Witte, with the duty 
to prepare the informed consent paper that it would present to parents of children. PCMC 
also recognized its legal duty to obtain informed consent, through its policy document titled 
"Patient and Family Rights". R. 3146. Under its own declared policies, PCMC had a duty 
to allow Plaintiff to participate in his son's health care, to make decisions to accept or refuse 
medical care, and to "be told if any proposed treatment is for the purpose of research, and to 
be able to consent or refuse to participate . . ." Id. Also, plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. 
Goldenring, who has extensive experience and is very familiar with informed consent issues 
in hospitals has testified that PCMC had a duty and breached its duty to obtain informed 
consent from plaintiff. 
Nevertheless, PCMC seeks relief from its duty of informed consent on the 
basis of Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 2003 UT 43, 79 P.3d 922. In 
Schaerrer, the court held that a pharmacist who did not manufacture a drug could not be held 
strictly liable under product-liability law for the drug's design defects, nor could he, under 
the "learned intermediary rule" be held strictly liable for failing to warn the drug's end-user. 
Id. at f 15. Under that rule "manufacturers of prescription drugs have a duty to warn only 
the physician prescribing the drug, not the end user or patient." Id. at \ 20. The court held 
that it would be "'incongruous' to impose upon pharmacists a duty to warn patients directly 
when the manufacturer did not have a similar duty" and so recognized that a "unique set of 
relationships necessitates adoption of the rule exempting pharmacists from strict products 
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liability for failure to warn of the risks of prescription drugs." Id. at Ulf 21-22. The unique 
circumstances included that physicians are "exclusive intermediaries" in the drug distribution 
system, pharmacists are limited in their ability to distribute drugs, and like manufacturers, 
do not have direct access to patients. Id. The court noted that holding pharmacists strictly 
liable to warn patients would undermine the physician-patient relationship by engendering 
fear, doubt and second-guessing, and would lead pharmacists to "present patients with 
confusing or contradictory information, cast doubt on the propriety of a physician's 
legitimate exercise of sound medical judgment, or even refuse to fill valid prescriptions in 
an effort to avoid liability." Id. If 21. 
Schaerrer has no application to the case at bar. Plaintiff has asserted no claim 
of strict liability against PCMC, nor is PCMC a manufacturer or a pharmacist. The court 
made clear that its holding, including extension of the learned intermediary rule to 
pharmacists, only applied to strict product liability claims, not to claims of professional 
malpractice or negligence, and only to the unique circumstances of manufacturers and 
pharmacists. Further, Schaerrer noted specifically that pharmacists and manufacturers would 
still be subject to liability for negligence, so long as there were facts to support such a claim. 
Id. 1JH 34, 37. 
Also, PCMC fails to recognize that even if the "learned intermediary doctrine" 
could be applied to exempt the conduct of PCMC's employees, PCMC would still be subject 
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to liability because, as set forth above, Dr. Witte was PCMC's agent, if not its employee. 
Under the law, her conduct is the conduct of PCMC. 
POINT V 
DR. GOLDENRING'S CAUSATION TESTIMONY IS NOT 
SPECULATIVE. 
Causation in the case is established through Dr. Goldenring's opinion that 
Derek died as a result of Defendants' breaches of the standard of care in attaching Derek to 
the sales model, Unfortunately, Defendants ignore Dr. Goldenring's plain and material 
testimony of causation, and, instead, embark on an irrelevant and speculative discussion 
about what might have happened had Defendants adhered to the standard of care. Thus, 
Defendants state, "When questioned about his causation opinion, Dr. Goldenring agreed that 
it would be speculative to say what Derek's outcome would have been absent the ventilator 
failure." Defendant University's brief p. 38. Obviously, Derek's future, had Defendants 
complied with the standard of care, is unknown. He could have lived eight days, eight 
weeks, or eighty years. Dr. Witte, just like Dr. Goldenring, acknowledged as much, 
Q: Okay. So he could have lived weeks? 
A: I think if he was going to die it probably would have been -
well, I just can't say. He could have gotten better or got worse. 
I just can't say when he would have died. 
R. 1265,124:20-24. 
-14-
Not only was Derek's future a matter of speculation, it is irrelevant to the 
elements of Plaintiffs' causes of action. In spite of Defendants' argument about "loss of 
chance" case law, the case at bar is not a loss of a chance case. Defendants did not simply 
decrease Derek's chance of survival through their breaches of the standard of care, 
Defendants caused Derek's death. 
During the deposition, Dr. Goldenring expressed his causation opinion (which, 
contrary to Defendants' assertion, was not simply based on Dr. Witte's similar opinion) and 
put Defendants' speculation in its proper place, when he testified as follows: 
Q: Do you have an opinion whether Dr. Witte's breach of the 
standard of care resulted in harm to Derek Nguyen? 
A: Well, yes. Because this ventilator was used, the child ended up 
having the feared complication, which is something went wrong, 
very bad luck, and they were not able to overcome the loss of 
ventilation that occurred. This machine essentially quit. It was 
faulty. Perhaps the entire design was faulty, but what happened 
was in fact it quit, and at that point, that stressed this child 
enough that they were not able to recover. 
Q: And he perished. 
A: I believe that that's what the record shows and also that that is 
what in fact even Dr. Witte told the father in the conference 
notes that we - that I have just reviewed today. 
Q: In other words, that as a result of the interruption in ventilation, 
he died. 
THE WITNESS: What it says - what I believe is that this hastened 
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this child's death. We've already established that we don't 
know when or if this child would have died, at least I don't and 
I so testified, but it's my belief that that's also what Dr. Witte 
suggested in her notes or the notes that were kept from the 
conference that this contributed to this child's death and 
certainly made it earlier than it would have been even if he 
would have died later, which again involves speculation, as I 
previously testified. 
Ex. 5, 114:6-115:10. See also, R. 1264, 120:5-9. 
Note that Dr. Goldenring never said that his causation opinion was speculative, 
only that what the future held was speculation, if Defendants had complied with the standard 
of care. While the trial court was confused and misled by Defendants' argumnents of 
speculation and loss of chance, the appellate court should see these arguments for what they 
are. The court should reverse the trial court's decision to exclude Dr. Goldenring's testimony 
on causation. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
EXCLUDING DR. GOLDENRING FROM TESTIFYING AT 
TRIAL RELATIVE TO PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE AND 
LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT CLAIMS. 
Because the trial court accepted Defendants' factual assertion that the sales 
model was used for emergency care and not for testing and evaluation, it also adopted all of 
Defendants' arguments erroneously accusing Dr. Goldenring of invading the province and 
treatment decisions of Dr. Witte, nurses, and respiratory therapists. While a trial court has 
discretion in qualifying expert witnesses, excluding an expert on the basis of an assumed, 
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unresolved factual assertion, is an abuse of that discretion. The court should reverse the trial 
court's abuse of discretion in precluding Dr. Goldenring from testifying at trial. 
As set forth in Plaintiffs principal brief, Dr. Goldenring offers no opinions 
exclusive to Dr. Witte's sub-specialties, to nursing, or to respiratory therapy. See e.g., R. 
1312,108:4-109:2. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, adequate foundation was laid for Dr. 
Goldenring to render opinions of standards of care applicable to Dr. Witte and Tammy Bleak. 
Defendants continue to ignore the straightforward Utah doctrine that an expert 
of one medical specialty may testify to a standard of care applicable to a defendant of a 
different specialty, provided sufficient foundation is laid. See, e.g., Boice v. Marble, 1999 
UT 7, Tflf 14, 15. Thus, in Boice, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's entry of 
summary judgment, finding that Boice had set forth sufficient foundation that Dr. Cantu, a 
neurosurgeon, was knowledgeable about a post-operative standard of care applicable to Dr. 
Marble, a physiatrist. Id. at ^ f 15. The trial court had erroneously concluded that because 
Dr. Cantu practiced in a field different than Dr. Marble, he was incompetent to testify to the 
appropriate standard of care for Dr. Marble. Id., at ^  13. 
Defendants, nevertheless, argue that for an expert to testify, he must know all 
of the standards of care applicable to a defendant. Thus, Defendant University 
mischaracterizes Plaintiffs position as arguing, "Dr. Goldenring is qualified to opine on the 
standard of care applicable to the entire team of health care providers involved in Derek's 
care even though Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to testify as to the standard of care for any 
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single member of that team." Defendant University brief, p. 27.l The fact, confirmed by 
Boice, is that Dr. Goldenring is qualified to testify to a standard of care for any member of 
Derek's multi-disciplinary health care team, so long as foundation is laid to establish his 
familiarity with a standard of care applicable to that team member. Such is the case in the 
matter at bar. 
Defendants also misstate Dr. Goldenring's administrative experience, arguing 
he is unqualified to criticize Tammy Bleak and Dr. Witte's administrative decision to test the 
sales model on Derek Nguyen, in violation of the hospital rules and before completion of the 
CTM process. Explaining his administrative experience, Dr. Goldenring testified, 
A: We've established that I have experience in administrative 
medicine for over ten years now. In that capacity -
administrative medicine really has a number of aspects. I have 
never been a hospital administrator specifically, but I interact 
with them and review them and look at clinical care and all 
kinds of other issues that result - that have anything to do with 
quality of care in hospitals all the time in my capacity as an 
HMO and IP A medical director. These involve maintaining our 
contracts and quality issues that are involved with that and it's 
really sort of a day-by-day thing that I very frequently do. So I 
believe that Fm familiar with many of the issues that go into 
care in hospitals because I have to be and I'm required to 
monitor them for IP A patients, for example, make sure that the 
hospitals are following the policies and procedures that they are 
required to follow and that my HMOs require them to follow. 
R. 1314, 110:17-111:8. (emphasis added). 
*If the court in Boice had adopted the arguments made by Defendants in the case at bar, the 
neurosurgeon would not have been allowed to testify, since he would not know all the standards of 
care applicable to physiatric medicine. The court, however, held that it was the neurosurgeon's 
familiarity with the standard of care germane to his opinion that qualified him to testify. 
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Defendant University argues that Dr. Witte did not have to follow the hospital 
rules, again, "Because the record establishes that use of the Pulmonetic ventilator was outside 
the scope of the CTM process, facts regarding that process or alleged standards of care 
established by the CTM committee are irrelevant." Defendant University brief p. 28. 
However, as set forth above, the purpose or purposes of using the sales model on Derek is 
a factual issue for jury resolution. 
Defendant PCMC misleadingly states that Dr. Goldenring was "was unaware 
of any written protocol, policy, or procedure that limited the patient population for clinical 
evaluation to moderately ill, stable patients." Although Defendant PCMC never produced 
the documents, Defendants' agents testified that these were the established rules, along with 
a requirement that parental informed consent be obtained. R. 1262, 86:15-87:7; R. 1277, 
58:7-17; R. 1331-32, 131:17-132:4; R. 1367-68, 121:13-123:1, 1291-93,75:17-77:14. 
Defendant PCMC also states that Dr. Goldenring has no experience as an 
attending physician of critically-ill children. Defendant PCMC's brief, p. 1. This is untrue. 
As set forth in Plaintiffs principal brief, Dr. Goldenring has cared for critically-ill children, 
like Derek Nguyen, in pediatric intensive care units of major children's hospitals. R. 1326-
27,124:25-125:4; R. 1314, 110:3-11. Also contrary to Defendants' arguments, Dr. 
Goldenring has been involved in informed consent issues in hospital care for many years. 
R. 1338,153:18-21. 
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Defendant University argues that its own expert testified that no informed 
consent was required because the sales model was FDA approved. This, argument, of 
course, ignores the hospital's CTM assessment process to determine reliability of the sales 
model and the rule established by the CTM committee requiring parental consent. FDA 
approval, of course, is for the design and not for a specific unit. Defendant PCMC's own 
clinical engineer Ramsey Worman, a member of the CTM committee, testified that he felt 
Primary Children's inspection of the sales-model ventilator was inadequate. R. 1372,42:15-
49:24. He disagreed with the hospital's decision to test it on any patients, much less 
critically-ill patients. Id. Dr. Goldenring testified, 
I also find it problematic that, as far as I could tell, here's a device that 
the hospital hasn't bought that it's still testing and we haven't informed 
the parents that we're going to use a device that really isn't tested and 
explain not only the risk of the transport but the risk of using a new 
device. Yes, it's FDA approved. That's a basic thing. But the hospital 
goes through that whole process of trying to test these FDA approved 
materials because they want to be sure it's going to work for what they 
want and that there isn't some glitch they can find. I mean what's the 
purpose of testing the equipment and seeing its capabilities? I mean 
you can read a brochure. No. They determined they were going to test 
it, which is very good. I love them for that. You should test it, just 
[but] something's approved by the FDA doesn't mean it's going to 
work all the time or in certain circumstances or do exactly what you 
want for it to be the best. So they have a process and they set it up and 
a whole bunch of different people are involved, many departments, 
good team approach, excellent approach. They set up a protocol and 
then we use it outside of the protocol by an individual physician 
decision. Seems wrong to me. That is not what we hold people to. 
You are responsible for your processes and the hospital personnel are 
responsible for staying within the rules of the process, in my opinion. 
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R. 1291-92,75:17-76:24. 
After arguing that no informed consent was required, Defendant University 
then inconsistently argues that informed consent was obtained, but the facts are that 
Defendants said nothing to Mr. Nguyen about the sales model, that it had never been used 
on a patient before, that it was in the hospital for testing and evaluation, that hospital rules 
prohibited its use on a patient in Derek's condition, that it had never previously been used 
to transport anyone, attached to anyone, nor even taken on a trial run, and that Derek would 
likely die from a failure of the sales model; all the material risks that a caring parent would 
want to know, in order to make an informed decision. R. 1889, 73:11-74:5, R. 1907, 94:1-
15, R. 3514, 92:4-17, R. 1247, 108:17-25. 
Defendants assert that there is no proof that Dr. Witte was a member of a health 
care team assigned to Derek's care that would obligate Dr. Witte to consult with other health 
care providers about any decision to transport Derek, but there is such evidence. See, R. 804, 
118:5-18, R. 108, If 21; R. 1257, 50:23-52:21; R. 1258, 61:3-16; R. 1245, 99:7-23. The 
evidence also establishes that Dr. Witte did not consult with any of the other members of 
Derek Nguyen's multi-disciplinary health-care team, nor anyone else about transporting him. 
R. 1256,48:21-25; R. 1257, 52:6-21; R. 1258,61:3-16; 1260,79:20-24; R. 1333,141:9-19; 
R. 1346-47,189:22-190:3; R. 1351,194:21-24. Standard procedure was for an attending 
physician to include members of the multi-disciplinary health-care team in the decision 
wether to transport a critically-ill patient, but Dr. Witte did not discuss transport with any 
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team members, not even the neurosurgeons who had previously deferred a CT scan because 
of transport danger. R. 1256,48:21-25; R. 1257,52:6-21; R. 1258,61:3-16; 1260,79:20-24; 
R. 1333, 141:9-19; R. 1346-47,189:22-190:3; R. 1351,194:21-24. 
Defendant University asserts that there is no proof that the AARC guidelines 
apply to physicians. These guidelines corroborate Dr. Goldenring' s opinion that the standard 
of care required Dr. Witte, as a member of Derek Nguyen's health care team, to consult with 
the other team members about any decision to transport Derek. Dr. Goldenring testified that 
they do apply to all team members, including physicians. R. 1340-41, 179:18-180:12; R. 
1342-43,182:19-183:11. 
In view of Defendants' many criticisms of Dr. Goldenring, it is worth 
remembering that the Utah Supreme Court has explained, "The rules of evidence establish 
a minimum baseline for expert qualifications. They do not mandate that litigants call only 
the most highly qualified experts to testify." Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, at f 19. 
Finally, sensing the weakness of their arguments about Dr. Goldenring's 
qualifications to address standards of care applicable to Defendants' agents, Defendant 
University embarks on new arguments never raised at the trial court level about the reliability 
of Dr. Goldenring's opinions under Rule 702(b), Utah R. Evid. In its motion to strike Dr. 
Goldenring as an expert witness, Defendant University asserted only two grounds, (1) "that 
Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to testify as an expert on the standard of care for a pediatric 
critical care physician" and (2) "Dr. Goldenring's causation opinions are speculative". R. 
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738-39. Likewise, Defendants entire 39 page memorandum was devoted to arguing these 
two assertions. See R. 743-82. The trial court then adopted Defendant's arguments in ruling 
that Dr. Goldenring was unqualfied and his causation testimony was speculative. Addendum 
5, R. 2589-2597. While the reliability of Dr. Goldenring's opinions is evidenced in 
plaintiffs principal brief, through setting forth the foundation for those opinions, the court 
should dismiss Defendant's attempt to raise new issues for the first time on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
A genuine issue of material fact regarding the purpose of the use of the sales 
model by Defendants' agents precludes summary judgment in the case at bar. The evidence, 
especially when viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, shows 
that Defendants' agents used Derek Nguyen as a test subject for Defendants' CTM clinical 
trial. 
Plaintiff has set forth sufficient evidence, especially when viewed in the light 
most favorable to Plaintiffs case, to submit Plaintiffs claims of IIED and punitive damages 
to the jury. The trial court erroneously entered summary judgment of Plaintiff s claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and for punitive damages. Defendants' conduct 
in using Derek as a test subject caused plaintiff severe emotional distress, was outrageous, 
is intolerable, and manifests a reckless disregard for the safety of Derek Nguyen and 
plaintiffs rights. 
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The trial court abused its discretion in precluding plaintiffs medical expert, 
John Goldenring, M.D., from testifying at trial Sufficient foundation was laid for Dr. 
Goldenring's testimony establishing standards of care applicable to the defendants, breaches 
of those standards, failure by defendants' agents to obtain informed consent, and causation 
of Derek Nguyen's death. The trial court should, therefore, also reverse dismissal of 
Plaintiffs claims for negligence and lack of informed consent. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals 
reverse the summary judgment entered by the trial court and remand the case for trial. 
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 26th day of June, 2009. 
Matthew H. Raty 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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